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SPECIAL ARTICLES 
Technology and Dialectics 
Nasir Tyabji 
The industrial revolution was defined b)' the phenoimenon of the application of s)stematically acquired knowledge 
(of thermodynamics) to the improvenment of production nmethods (the steam engine). The implications of this lay, 
decisively, in opening the area of knowledge of production methods, in general, to human enquiry. This was given 
the (refurbished) namie of technology, and accorded a central role in the dialectics of capitalism. Later, the 1931 
Interntational Conference on the History of Science and Technology fornmulated key ideas in the dialectics of 
technology. Thzis groundwork laid the basis for substantial advances in the history of technology in the subsequent 
years. 
However, inadequate theoretical elaboration of the institutional forms in which technological knowledge is 
commercialised has created the space for thze growth of arcane theories of technology, which attribute to it a 
malignant agency. The emotive appeal of these theories is indicative of the reality: the results of the post-1945 
scientific and technological revolution are expressed in forms structured by a transnational-donminated world 
economy. 
I 
Introduction 
ECONOMICS is virtually unique amongst 
the social sciences in its long-standing interest 
in analysing the nature and causes of 
technological change. Adam Smith in the 
18th century was followed by Andrew Ure, 
Charles Babbage and, of course, Marx and 
Schumpeter in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
However, most of the contributions by 
economists of a more contemporary period 
are not particularly relevant to the study of 
technology as a specific social science.' The 
reason for this is that the primary concern 
of recent economic theorising is with the role 
of technology in the process of economic 
growth, which is itself defined in increasingly 
more rigorous terms. While this is obviously 
a positive feature, it is an accompanying 
methodological concern that limits the 
discussion of technological issues. This is 
the presumption that the major concern in 
theorising is with the nature of competition 
in the market which would best promote 
economic growth. It is the assumption that 
it is necessarily competition between discrete 
entities (the finr), and that too, through the 
mechanism of the market, that advances 
technological knowledge that is the really 
limiting feature (or more precisely the 
ideological element) of most of the work 
undertaken by economists in the field.. 
Until relatively recently, of course, the 
specific natureof the way in which technology 
was conceptualised in economic literature 
was not really of concern. This was largely 
because issues of economic growth were the 
only channel through which technology 
impressed itself on the public consciousness. 
lt was only with the evolution of the 'general 
student of technology' that there arose the 
need for a concept of technology as an entity 
with its own dialectics. This led to the 
recognition of the (necessarily) partial 
characterisation of technology within 
economic literature. 
A majorimpetus to the study of technology 
came from the effects of the major 
technological developments of the last 50 
years which have been identified as markers 
of the scientific and technological revolution.2 
The development of processes for the 
controlled release of nuclear energy, the 
possibility of major human organ transplants, 
the introduction of birth control mechanisms 
and the development of electronics form one 
aspect of this era. However, it has coincided 
with the appearance of the atomic and 
hydrogen bomb, the criminal introduction 
of i mperfectly tested drugs such as 
tlhalidomide, and the prevalence of a series 
of disasters such as plane crashes, dam bursts 
and nuclear blowups which has even led to 
the sardonic characterisation of this era as 
associated with 'normal accidents'.' These 
events have given fresh life to the growth 
of artifactist hought- a line of philosophical 
reasoning that argues that the disasters 
sometimes associated with the use of modern 
technological artifacts are caused by the very 
nature of the technological processes 
themselves. 
In one of its most recent formulations, the 
artifactist line of reasoning would distinguish 
between the implications for society between 
the handtools of the handicrafts era and the 
machines of subsequent eras as follows: 
because they are dependent on human users 
for both their source of movement and for 
guidance in their action, handtools have a 
unique relationship and dependency on 
human beings. To the extent that machines 
become independent, not only of human 
energy sources, but also of a human directing 
agency (as with automation) they begin to 
achieve a degree of autonomy.4 Further, 
because machines concentrate increasingly 
greater quantum of energy in the hands of 
users, they necessarily introduce inequalities 
into the social order that would otherwise 
not be present. According to this line of 
reasoning, the person who owns a machine 
has more power than one who does not. 
Power is thus seen to grow out of the structure 
of the tool or machine rather than from the 
social organisation. 
Leading on from this argument is the 
proposition that technology can become auto- 
nomous in relation to human users (even if 
not to its manufacturers). Different kinds of 
technology can have inherent features that 
generate quitedistinctive impacts on societal 
orders. Most crucially, thisistrueindependent 
of the social context within which some 
particular technology might be embedded or 
the particular social process it is associated 
with. 
One of the major reasons for the growth 
and social acceptability of this line of 
reasoning has lain in the frightening attempts 
by some proponents of technology to promote 
technological solutions to societal crisis even 
before the problem has been decomposed 
into its socio-cultural (and political) and 
technological components. This is a mani- 
festation of the propagation of a technological 
philosophy of technology (and society). This 
attempts, as did mechanistic philosophies of 
science with the emerging social sciences of 
the 19th century, to represent technological 
reasoning as a superior mode of thought to 
all others.5 
It is for these reasons that renewed concern 
must be generated for views of technology 
which, while grounding themselves in a con- 
crete analysis of the presentsituation, provide 
a direction by which this situation may be 
transcended. It is quite clear that such a path 
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cannot be located within a trajectory of 
technological transformation alone: however, 
it is equally clearthat it requires a conception 
of technology and its relationship to society 
which will permit such a transformation, i 
e, both a dialectics of technology and a 
dialectics of technology and society. 
II 
Technology as an Object of Enquiry 
With the scientific revolution of the 16th 
and 17th centuries, the idea that science was 
not a hard-and-fast system of knowledge, 
but rather a system in constant flux (and that 
this could more accurately be called a process 
of knowledge acquisition) became generally 
accepted. In fact, without this change there 
could not have developed a distinct branch 
of knowledge now characterised as the history 
of science.6 Simultaneously, with the 
dramatic challenge which Keppler's and 
Copernicus' theories posed to the church, 
came the recognition that science was a 
special kindofknowledge.Thephilosophical 
basis of this knowledge, expressed through 
both ideas and theories, came to be 
characterised as positivism, based as it was 
on extensions to Newtonian mechanics. 
Modern theories of dialectics may be seen 
to be the result of the development of the 
philosophy of science. Philosophy, of course, 
is engaged with science both in terms of the 
theories of science and theories about science. 
On the other hand, scientific theories and 
their associated ideas began quite early to 
influence visions of both the natural order 
and that of human societies: to the extent 
that philosophy implies a world view, 
scientific thought constitutes an implicit 
philosophy. However, in its primary sense 
philosophy of science is concerned with the 
nature of ideas and theories about science. 
It is well accepted that questions such as the 
nature of science, the meaning of science and 
theconcept of truth in science are all important 
issues in the philosophy of science. 
Because technology is usually understood 
to mean the act of making and using tools, 
and later, machines, the relationship between 
technology and ideas is not as easily apparent 
as that between science and ideas. Often, 
when ideas are at all associated with techno- 
logy, they are seen to be scientific ideas used 
in a practical context.7 This is a long distance 
away from, and al so an indication of the very 
limited progress made in the 160 years since 
Babbage laid down the intellectual 
possibilities of technological enquiry:8 
...,the arrangements which ought to regulate 
the interior economy of a manufactory are 
founded on principles of deeper root than 
may have been supposed, and are capable 
of being usefully employed in preparing the 
road to some of the sublimest investigations 
of the human mind. 
Much earlier, of course, Bacon had argued 
that traditional philosophy had done less to 
change the world than had the invention of 
gun powder, printing and the compass. 
Philosophy (especially natural philosophy) 
should thus change its focus of concern and 
should became allied with the process of 
manufacture of tools.9 
The 17th century scientific revolution is, 
of course, synonymous with the disjuncture 
with the ancient idea of science, which saw 
its role to be the explanation of directly 
perceived reality."' Further, experimental 
science defined itself, by contrast with 
Aristotelian thought, by postulating the 
application of geometrical and mechanical 
laws to nature. This was in opposition to 
efforts at the development of purely an 
intellectual vision of realities beyond the 
tangible world." More importantly, it 
established the sphere of production as a 
legitimate area for the application of reason. 
Thus defined, technological 'thought' arises 
when the scientific revolution recognises 
and requires the incorporation of the analysis 
of the sphere of production techniques to 
further its own development. 
This was the beginning of the era of tech- 
nological thought but not yet of technology. '2 
A much longer period was necessary, in fact 
several centuries before this interaction 
between science and productive technique 
could be put into practice. On the one hand, 
Bacon's idea of combining the resource- 
fulness of scientists, craftspeople and entre- 
preneurs in the better production of com- 
modities granted a legitimacy and power to 
technical knowledge which existing societies 
were not prepared to admit. On the other 
hand, and more decisively, those very 
societies had not developed the economic 
forms of organisation within which the appli- 
cation of science to production methods 
would bring about decisive (economic) ad- 
vantage. A technical culture was still only 
perceived as in the nature of a promise, with- 
out its own institutions and professional 
practitioners capable of influencing the eco- 
nomic and social organisation of the world. 
In the English speaking world, the word 
technology has come to mean the specialised 
knowledge associated with production in all 
historical eras, and techniques to the skills 
and methods associated with production (or 
even with cultural and social activities such 
as swimming and dancing). On theEuropean 
continent, in contrast, technique denotes all 
activities associated with production while 
technology is specific to the more advanced 
methods. Technology embodies accumulated 
knowledge, labour power and skills which 
owe their effectiveness to the use of tools 
for a long historical period. However a 
qualitatively new dimension is added by the 
way technology interrelates with science, 
and to the industrial system, to develop and 
achieve results. 
Artifactist thought, of course, would claim 
that human societies have always been 
technological in nature, initially creators of 
tools, and then of machines. However, this 
transposition of the modern meaning of 
technology to cover production techniques 
which originated before the scientific 
revolution, essentially ignores the radical 
changes brought about by the growing 
connection between science and production 
from the mid-I9th century onwards. This is 
in no way to ignore the historical evidence 
that in the pre-machine age, production 
methods could be systematised by 
formalising intuitive skills, the process of 
trial-and-error learning, to non-theoretical 
tools or maxims, and to some extent to 
articulate skill in descriptive mathematical 
forms. The change which gave technology 
its modern sense was the development of the 
strictly technological disciplines, of the 
strictly scientific production techniques, and 
the introduction of a body of professionals, 
engineers, technologists and managers. 
Parenthetically, it may also be noted that 
there exists in the heritage of philosophic 
thought, at least an implicit philosophy of 
pre-machine age production methods which 
implies the fundamental distinction between 
the production knowledge system of that 
period and of technology.'3 
Technology thus dates from the era of 
mechanisation, the industrial revolution, 
professional training for engineers and the 
ever-closer integration of science and 
production methods.'4 The first two 
conditions were met by the end of the 1 8th 
century, the third came in the 19th century, 
while the fourth, begun in the 19th century, 
was completed in the form of the scientific 
and technological revolution in the mid-20th 
century. In its most developed form, 
technology implies the existence of both the 
factory and the laboratory in a systematic 
relationship. '" 
It is significant that the word technology 
was given its modern meaning and came into 
general usage in the 20th century when 
handicraft production had been decisively 
replaced by machine-based production, and 
with economic processes both creating new 
branches of industry and large sale expansion 
of the older branches. This process of mecha- 
nisation raised the issue of technological 
dynamism in a political andeconomic context 
and led, eventually, to the concern shown 
by economists with the nexus between 
technology and economic growth, noted at 
the beginning of this paper. 
III 
Technology as an Area of Enquiry 
The delineation of an area of enquiry 
denoted by technological thought arose, as 
has been noted, at almost the same time as 
that of the new scientific thought. However, 
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the major impetus to the general study of 
technology came almost three centuries later, 
with the Soviet delegation's intervention in 
the 1931 International Congress for the 
History of Science and Technology in 
London. II The most celebrated of the papers, 
by B Hessen dealt with the social and 
economic context of Newton's Principia. 
Although the paper was concerned with a 
period predating the industrial revolution, 
the vital link with modern concerns lay in 
the methodological innovation based on the 
way it formulated the relationship between 
the world of science and the techniques of 
navigation, of ship-building methods and of 
propulsion problems, all of which grew 
directly out of the contemporary political 
economy.'7 
Implicit in Hessen's analysis were three 
components to an adequate conception of 
technology: the 'technological history of 
technology' (or more accurately, the 
dialectics of technology), the relationship 
both between science and the process of 
technological change and the role of 
technological innovation in presenting 
problems promoting scientific advance; and, 
finally, the relationship between the 
technological area of inquiry and other social 
and cultural institutions and activities." It 
needs to be emphasised that the dialectics 
of technology, or the logic specific to the 
evolution of technology is quite distinct to 
the logic of socio-economic history. 
Although these logics are quite distinct, 
theirrelationship has also adialectical nature. 
Engels had, in fact, demonstrated this with 
his analysis of the industrial revolution. 
Technologically this event was defined by 
the initiation of the interaction between 
science and production methods, personified 
by the innovation of the steam engine. 
Equally, the methodological perils of 
disassociating the technological dialectic 
from social and economic history can clearly 
be seen in the subsequent trajectory of the 
concept of the industrial revolution. 
Popularised by the series of lectures given 
by Arnold Toynbee, it was subsequently 
enmeshed in controversies about whether 
the industrial revolution was, in fact, a mark 
of any significant socio-economic or cultural 
change (the postulated domain of historical 
enquiry); or even granting the validity of the 
technological aspect of history, about which 
specific element of the new machine-based 
production system it is which is paramount 
in defining the industrial revolution.'9 
These, however, are arguments of detail. 
Technologically, the industrial revolution 
had as its basis, the transition from the tool 
used by the handicrafts-based production 
system to the three element system of a 
machine (the prime mover, the transmission 
mechanism and the tool). Subsequent changes 
in one element of the machine, the tool, 
either through increases in its individual 
size, or in the number it was proposed to 
operate simultaneously, brought about a 
contradiction with the prevailing forms of 
motive mechanisms (wind, waterand animal 
or human effort). The search for a more 
powerful and stable source of motive power 
led to the development of the steam engine. 
The complex of large-scale machine 
production based on steam, which continued 
up to the 1880s and 1890s defined an 
historical era with some specific 
characteristics.2 
Generally there was a specific process for 
a given product. The differentiation and 
specialisation of productive processes had 
progressed very little. This, in turn, meant 
that there were few variations in the forms 
of organisation and management of 
production. Mass production, based on the 
use of interchangeable parts was almost 
completely absent and so were practices of 
technological process control and the use of 
measuring tools. The job content of workers 
was differentiated only by the specific 
industry they worked in. Within an industry, 
this differentiation was determined by the 
character of the work process, such as 
spinning, weaving and finishing in textiles. 
Even the range of skills required to service 
machinery was limited by the small degree 
of functional specialisation of the machinery. 
In fact, the controversy over the specific date 
when the industrial revolution can be said 
to have taken place is due precisely to the 
fact that at this stage the diffusion of science 
induced machines was actually confined to 
the area of mechanical forms of power for 
the major processes, and to some extent with 
metal working procedures on machine 
manufacture itself. Finally, although the trend 
of improving machinery through the 
application of science was developing, the 
aim of scientific research was generally 
inclined towards the explanation of natural 
phenomena and had little impact in machine 
production. 
Although the key shift, both historically 
and logically, is in terms of the transition 
from production technique to technology in 
knowledge systems, and from tools to 
machines in the associated production 
systems, the dialectics of technology 
obviously lead to still further changes.2' As 
the machine becomes increasingly 
independent of human or natural energy 
input, its character as an object undergoes 
critical transformations. Thus, the 
replacement of steam engines by electric 
motors gave a new form to both the prime 
mover and to the transmission mechanism 
of the three element machine. This both 
allowed the much larger physical separation 
of the prime mover and tool, through the 
agency of a distinct electric motor for each 
tool, and the possibilities of individual 
variation in what were now machine systems, 
working at different speeds. More 
significantly (and this was basedon advances 
in chemistry) was the transition to an entirely 
new form of machine. It was now no longer 
a static object but both the embodiment of, 
and the initiator of operations, or of special 
physical, chemical or electrica! processes.22 
The design and construction of such 
process engendering and process enclosing 
machines imply not only the fabrication of 
a physical object, but of a process. 
Simultaneously, as machines expand their 
scope from mechanical to chemical and 
electrical processes, and are then linked 
together into systems, they become 
characterisable as objectified processes. This 
development may also be seen from another 
angle. Historically, the machine had 
developed from wind and water powered 
energy transformers to batch processing 
production (first of textiles, but then of 
chemicals), machining and assembly 
operations (using machine tools), and finally, 
industrial assembly lines. There is a 
difference, for instance, between using 
machines to manufacture anumberof discrete 
articles, even when such articles are identical, 
and the bulk manufacture of some product 
that is homogeneous and uniform throughout, 
whether made in separate batches or 
continuously. In the latter case, the machine 
that makes such processes possible is itself 
a process of a kind. It is these developments 
which make the specific branch of knowledge 
and expertise characterised as technology an 
objective process (or dynamic system) in 
itself. While pre-machine age production 
knowledge relied for guidance primarily on 
sensory-motor skills, technical maxims and 
descriptive laws, technology bases itself on 
all three but also, increasingly, on specific 
technological laws and theories which are 
made possible by modern science and which, 
in turn, lead to engineering design. 
Amongst the reasons why the dialectics 
of technology has received little attention, 
let alone systematic investigation, is the 
difficulty in clearly mapping out the area 
specific to science and to technology. There 
is the still greater problem in determining 
the nature of the relationship between them 
which is made more complex by historical 
experience of the changing nature of this 
relationship. The view that technology is 
merely applied science and the associated 
methodological construct, the linear model 
of the innovative process has been effectively 
challenged.23 However a more sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship is still to 
be developed. It may be recalled that the 
linear model represented technological 
change purely in terms of innovations. 
Secondly, these innovations resulted from 
a process closely dependent upon, and 
generated by, prior scientific research. It is 
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ironic that this model may, in fact, have had 
its origins in the soundly dialectical pro- 
position that the marker of the industrial 
revolution was the application of science to 
the development of machinery in the form 
of the steam engine. 
During the entire period of the dominance 
of the steam engine as prime mover, which 
lasted up to the end of the 19th century, it 
may have been true that scientific ideas were 
employed to bring about improvements in 
productive machinery. The reason for this 
is the early development of the science of 
dynamics through Galileo and Newton.24 
However, with the development of processes 
in applied ch,emistry, and the industrial uses 
of electricity, the gap between the existing 
knowledge-base and the expertise required 
to construct economically viable production 
systems grew unacceptably large. Thus, 
although Perkin had succeeded (though 
accidentally) in the laborat6ry synthesis of 
mauve, the first of the aniline dyes, in 1856, 
the breakthrough was of little industrial 
consequence until theprocess could be scaled 
up for large-scale processing. However, the 
design and construction of such plants 
involves an entirely different set of activities 
and capabilities than those that generated the 
new chemical entities in the laboratory. First 
of all, the problems of mixing, heating and 
contaminant control, which can be carried 
out with great precision in the laboratory, 
are immensely more difficult to handle in 
large-scale operations, especially if high 
degrees of precision are required. Eventually, 
to manage the transition from test tubes to 
manufacture, where output has to be measured 
in tons rather than grams, an entirely new 
methodology, totally distinct from the science 
of chemistry had to be devised. This 
methodology used, as a central concept, the 
idea of unit operations, such as pulverising, 
heating, crystallising and so on, and signified 
the emergence of chemical engineering as 
a body of knowledge not reducible to applied 
chemistry.25 
Further, with the growth of large-scale 
production, the institutional innovation of 
the industrial research laboratory has 
provided -the means for the empirical 
observation of the reciprocal flow from 
technology to science. It has, in fact, been 
suggested that as an alternative to the 
commonly held view of contemporary high 
technology industries as those based on 
science, it can be suggested that industries 
at the technological frontier help to define 
the research agenda for science. This is 
particularly true when the high quality of 
scientific personnel in industrial aboratories 
makes them an acceptable peer group for 
scientists in academic institutes. 
Themethodological point to bemade from 
this discussion is that the modern concept 
of technology originated in an historical 
event, the industrial revolution. Subse- 
quently, the concept has evolved as both the 
industrial structure, and the institutions 
associated with this structure have changed. 
This evolution is historically linked, of course, 
with the developments in capitalism. A speci- 
fic example of the latter lies in the heigh- 
tened degree of transnational competition in 
the technologically advanced industries ince 
the early and mid- 1970s. The often remarked 
fact that Japanese investment in basic 
research, which is considerably less than in 
its major competitor countries, has not pre- 
vented Japanese pre-eminence in advanced 
technologies has, clearly, had an impact on 
the realisation of the complex character of 
the science-technology relationship. 
Even within the specific area of the 
dialectics of technology, progress seems to 
have been less than could have been expected 
because of the lack of attention paid by social 
scientists to the 'engineering method'. Part 
of the problem, of course, lies in the specific 
activity of engineers, and therefore in the 
analysis of the method. Engineering as a 
profession is identified with the systematic 
knowledge of how to design useful artifacts 
or processes, a discipline that includes some 
science and mathematics, the engineering 
sciences such as strength of materials, 
thermodynamics and electronics. However, 
in a significant choice of words, a historian 
of chemical engineering notes that "Often, 
in dealing with a complicated practical 
situation, the engineer arbitrarily reduces the 
number of variables in [the] ... theory by 
combining them into dimensionless groups, 
of which a well known example is the 
Reynolds number characterising the flow of 
fluid through a pipe".26 This implies that 
the actual activity of the technologist is dis- 
tinct to the theoretical basis that underlies 
the documented knowledge system. It is 
then difficult to discern a pattern of consis- 
tent behaviour which would qualify as a 
distinctly technological sphereof knowledge. 
It is equally, if not more true however, that 
a failure to understand the concept of the 
technological sciences has prevented suf- 
ficient attention being paid to the data 
which are available for analysis. 
IV 
Scientific and Technological 
Revolution 
As in the case of the industrial revolution 
of the 18th century, and the transformation 
brought about by the chemical-electrical 
innovations of the 19th century, the scientific 
and technological revolution represents a 
moment in all three of the components of 
technology mentioned earlier: the movements 
within technological knowledge itself, the 
relationship between this and the current 
phase of scientific knowledge, and the 
connections between technological enquiry 
and other fields of social and cultural activity. 
An elaboration of these moments will help 
in defining the scientific and technological 
revolution. 
As far as the dialectics of technology are 
concerned, the qualitative feature which 
distinguishes the scientific and technological 
revolution from previous periods lies in the 
change in the principle which has, until 
recently, guided technological evolution. 
Usually this evolution is defined in terms of 
the degree of sophistication of the production 
mechanism; thus the era of handicraft 
techniques, then of manufacture and, later, 
of machine based production and automation. 
Alternatively, thereis possibleaperiodisation 
based on the energy source, the era of manual 
labour (and wind and water power), the age 
of steam and that of electricity. However, 
the scientific and technological revolution 
encompasses a far wider range of phenomena 
than the energy base or the nature of the 
production mechanism. It is not merely 
another stage in technological evolution but 
stands in contrast to all earlier periods. This 
can be made clearif thedistinguishing feature 
is correctly identified. 
[f the division into periods is based on the 
method of human interaction with the raw 
materials found in a natural form, then a 
unitary principle can be seen to underlie the 
technological developments of all preceding 
eras. The increasing sophistication in the use 
of the principle, in fact, defines a very long 
cycle of development and generates a 
common content and logic of evolution. The 
principle is, of course, that of the mechanical 
processing of materials. Technological 
progress during this entire cycle was primarily 
concerned with addressing the problem of 
more efficient ways of mechanical 
processing. 
Thus irrespective of the tools or machinery 
used in this period, in the transition from 
manual to mechanised forms of production, 
the laws of the mechanical world were the 
guiding principle. Within this framework, 
all earlier periods, in spite of the great 
differences in the character of the instruments 
used had a unifying feature, in terms of the 
principle on which they interacted with 
nature. In fact, J D Bernal has argued that 
even in the era of manual production, 
solutions to most mechanical and technical 
problems in the processing and combination 
of materials had been identified. Subsequent 
developments have used these solutions as 
the basis for more efficient methods of 
(mechanical) processing. 
There is another way in which the uni- 
formity of the cycle of technical develop- 
ment may be traced. This lies in the nature 
of the energy transformation process: the 
ultimate objective of using all the sources 
of energy which had been developed was for 
the transformation into mechanical forms 
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of energy. Even the initial development of 
automation was towards improving the 
continuity of a production process based on 
mechanical principles. 
Under these conditions, technological 
development implied an increase in the 
capital-output ratio. Industrial progress was 
associated with enormous expenditure on 
production machinery, natural resources and 
in thedemand forhighly trained and qualified 
workers. These requirements arose out of the 
principle (or paradigm) of mechanical 
processing because, within the logic of this 
principle, technological advance may take 
place but the principle itself cannot be 
modified or changed. 
The period of development of the 
mechanical processing of natural materials 
covered a very long period during which the 
potential of the principle was fully realised. 
In one respect, however, the previous era did 
lay the foundations for the subsequent 
scientific and technological revolution. This 
was, as h; been noted, the development of 
automation, which has removed the necessity 
of human participation in the 'mechanical' 
aspects of production. Precisely as the 
developmentofautomatic devices is bringing 
the era of mechanical processing to an end, 
principles of automation are providing the 
basis for the 'machineless' stage of 
production of the new technological era.2' 
This type of production is concretised in 
the metallurgical and petro-chemical 
industries where there is certainly a raw 
material, but no machinery in the accepted 
sense of the word. Rather, the end-product 
is obtained by the systematic subjection of 
the raw material to pressure and temperature 
changes, often with the use of catalysts. The 
parameters under which the process operates 
successfully (and safely) are so many in 
number and interconnected that, without 
automation, it would be impossible to operate 
them at all. 
The second manifestation of the scientific 
and technological revolution lies in 
qualitatively new features in the science- 
technology relationship. Although the 
application of scientific knowledge to the 
development of the steam engine is a concrete 
manifestation of the principle of the industrial 
revolution, science and technology largely 
continued to develop on parallel lines. 
Although they intersected and interacted with 
each other, their progress was not organically 
linked. In the second half of the 20th century, 
the interconnection between the two 
intensified dramatically and it then became 
possible to speak of 'scientific and techno- 
logical progress'. This integration created a 
system and thus an object of enquiry in itself. 
Although scientific and technological 
progress has emerged as a system or a process, 
technological development continues to take 
place to a substantial extent on the basis of 
purely empirical enquiry. As the productive 
apparatus operates, practical problems arise 
and require solution even if the scientific 
basis is not yet available. In other words, not 
all varieties of industrial technology are 
equally open, as yet, to scientific analysis. 
By and large, the more complex the basis 
of the technology, the greater is the time 
required for its development or for its 
restructuring on a scientific basis. Seen in 
these terms, the scientific and technological 
revolution marks the beginning of the period 
in which more complex processes (electronic 
and biological) form the basis of production. 
Although it is these developments in 
productive technology which set the most 
challenging tasks for science, in fact all 
varieties of technological change present 
new scientific problems. Apart from the 
revolutionary innovations, there are also 
changes in the generation of a technology 
where the fundamental scientific principle 
remains unchanged and, of course, incre- 
mental changes in one ormore characteristics 
of a given generation of technology. 
It is, of course, a matter of definition that 
the science-technology interactions are most 
significant in the so-called high technology 
industries. But it must also be recognised, 
to begin with, that there still remnain crucial 
portions of high technology industries where 
attempts to advance thetechnological frontier 
are painstakingly slow and expensive, 
becaiust of the limited guidance that science 
is capable of providing. 
If science could provide alogical predictive 
base for moving to optimal design 
congligra-lons, development costs (which 
account for about two-thirds of the R and D 
expenditure in the US) would not be such 
a high proportion of technology development 
expenditure. The reason why they are so 
high is because engineers and product 
designers continue to need to engage in very 
extensive testing activities before they can 
be sufficiently confident in the performance 
characteristics of a new product. 
The interaction between science, techno- 
logy and production began with the industrial 
revolution, gathered momentum with the 
developments in chemical technology and 
the continuous processing industries, and 
has reached a highpoint with the scientific 
and technological revolution. Such a method 
of placing this revolution in its historical 
context is a starting point towards its 
characterisation, but there is also a need to 
identify the nature of the processes underway 
within both science and technology. 
The specific features of present day science 
lie in the addition, or at least greater 
im-portance, given to lines of enquiry which 
until recently formed a minor aspect of the 
scientist's work. While continuing with the 
object of refining the analysis and ex planation 
of the natural world, the sphere of operation 
of science is now increasingly weighted 
towards synthesis, and to the elaboration of 
control as a process in itself. In more concrete 
terms, the qualitative dimension is provided 
by the combination of analysis and 
explanation with fundamentally different 
processes. These include controlled 
intervention in the structure of w,aterials, the 
synthesis of substances with specific, 
predetermined, properties, the development 
and control of nuclear fusion and fission 
reactions, the elaboration of thcories of 
information and control and, finally, 
intervention in organic processes (the basis 
of biotechnology). 
The third area of enquiry relevant to the 
study of technology is the interaction between 
other spheres of cultural and social activity 
and the productive system. It is here that 
there has been the greatest failure to develop 
the dialectics of technology appropriate to 
the era of the scientific and technological 
revolution. As has been mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, the urgency of the 
attempt to identify an adequate conceptual 
basis for technology itself arises from the 
social and cultural effects of this revolution. 
However, this is clearly insufficient in itself. 
What is required is also a methodology to 
address the issues of the effects of advanced 
technologies on society and culture which 
has been heightened by a series of accidents 
with tragic consequences, mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. 
Concretely, this would imply the deve- 
lopment of detailed case studies of the con- 
siderations underlying the commercialisa- 
tion of the research and development efforts 
within transnational corporations. Currently, 
this is the major source through which new 
technologies impinge on the public con- 
sciousness. Included within the ambit of the 
research would be the process of appropria- 
tion by these corporations of many new ideas 
which originateelsewhere, and the marketing 
efforts ai med at the creation of new consumer 
desires, which may be marginally related to 
the actual potential of a new technology. It 
seems that unless this area is addressed, 
questions of the absence of any ethical basis 
for the adoption of some new technologies, 
the impossibility of effecting democratic 
control over the direction in which some 
others are evolving, and so on, are going to 
lead to impasses. The end result may well 
be a series of diversions from the more 
substantive movement forward which 
Bagrit saw as the ultimate advantage of the 
age of automation. 
[Presented at the Conference on the History of 
Science and Civilisations, NISTADS, September 
1996, and subsequently at the Indian Institute of 
Advanced Study, Shimla, October 1996. 1 am 
grateful to C K Raju for his intervention in the 
Conference and to Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and 
Romila Thapar for their detailed discussions on 
an earlier draft.] 
Economic and Political Weekly March 29, 1997 655 
This content downloaded from 122.176.10.186 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 09:18:46 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Notes 
I For Marx's contribution, see Rosenberg 
(1976). All the references mentioned by 
Freeman(1994) are, in his own words, neo- 
Schumpeterian in inspiration. van den Belt 
and Rip ( 1987) also suggest that the renewed 
interest in Schumperterian methodology may 
provide the basis for such a social science 
analysis. 
2 The concept was probably used for the first 
time by Bernal. It is clear that Bagrit (1966) 
was referring to the same phenomenon in the 
discussion of the "Age of Automation". The 
social and cultural effects of the revolution 
in the western world form the basis for David 
Harvey's analysis of the 'Condition of Post- 
Modernity' (1990). 
3 Mitcham (1994) has a food-for-thought 
provoking chronology of the dual aspects of 
the effects of the Scientific and Technological 
Revolution. 
4 Although artefactist hought does not formally 
define the concept of a machine, its line of 
argument is consistent with the accepted 
definition that the machine, at least in its 
earlier phases was characterised by three 
elements: the power source or motive 
mechanism, the transmission mechanism and 
the tool. It is important to note that the motive 
mechanism can be provided by human, animal 
or natural agency. Machines can thus be dated 
from the era of wind and water mills, 
handlooms, and simple harvesting devices. 
5 Although Dr Strangelove exemplifies the 
approach in its most alarming form, this 
philosophical basis underlies the development 
plans introduced in the postwar era in third 
world countries, in state-led attempts at 
'technological transformation'. Anchiskin 
( 1 987) refers to the tendency as a form of neo- 
positivism (pp 195-200). Mitcham (1994) 
sees it as the attempt by 'Engineering 
Philosophy of Technology' to hegemonise 
the entire field of philosophical enquiry 
(pp 19-93). See, also, llyenkov (1982). 
6 Kedrov ( 1977) discusses the criteria defining 
a scientific revolution in some detail. The 
evolution of science is considered in ways 
germane to the concerns of this paper by both 
Mikulinsky (1977) and Salomon (1990). 
7 This is, of course, the basis of the linear model 
of basic science-applied science-technology. 
For the effects, on the technology base, of 
state policy resting on the very simplest version 
of this model in India, see Parthasarathi ( 1987). 
8 Quoted in Rosenberg (1994), p 24. 
9 Perhaps because he has been influenced by 
his own chronology of the disasters associated 
with the second half of the 20th century, 
Mitcham ( 1994) feels that "... practical efficacy 
in changing the world is not the highest or 
most inclusive criterion of judgment. When 
somieone wants to bring about practical 
change, it always makes sense to ask why or 
for what?" (p 140). 
10 In other words, the underlying premise earlier 
was that the object of scientific enquiry was 
thatwhich was tangibleorseemed perceptible. 
For a detailed discussion, see Kedrov ( 1977), 
pp 52-54. 
11 Koyre (1989) has an interesting discussion 
on Galileo's ambivalencetowards Plato's view 
of science. 
12 The distinction between 'technological 
thought' and 'technology' and the discussion 
in the following paragraphs is developed from 
Salomon (1990). 
13 Mitchamn deals with the western tradition 
(pp 1 17-34). 
14 In addition to the replacement of tools by 
machines, the process of mechanisation also 
incorporates the diffusion of mechanisms (of 
which the clock is the outstanding example). 
The distinction between a machine and a 
mechanism is that the former is designed to 
perform work (in the sense that physics and 
Inechanics recognise). 
15 See Noble (1979) for a detailed account of 
the growth of corporate industrial research 
laboratories. 
16 Although this claim is made by Mikulinsky 
( 1977), it is given unexpected support by the 
admission by Redondi in his introduction to 
Bhattacharya nd Redondi ( 1990). The papers 
were published under the title of Science at 
the Crossroads. See, also, Olwell (1996). 
17 Hessen (1931). 
18 These, it was noted by Daumas (1969), had 
been formulatedby LucienFebvre. Ironically, 
this was part of the effort by which Annales 
entered the field "... where other historical 
methods, notably Marxist historical 
materialism already seemed to be so firmly 
entrenched". (Pietro Redondi's introduction 
to Bhattacharya and Redondi (1990) p 7. 
19 In otherwise important contributions to a 
dialectical conception of technology, Daumas 
( 1969) raises the first issue (pp 222-25) while 
Salomon ( 1990) raises the second (pp 260-63). 
20 This, and the succeeding paragraphs, are based 
on the discussion in Heinman (1981), pp 61-65. 
21 This is a process defined by Heinman (1981) 
as "scientific and technological progress" 
(pp 17-34). 
22 Detailed descriptions ofthese transformations 
are in Heinman (1981), pp 65-80 and 
Anchiskin ( 1987) pp 126-76. Mitcham ( 1994), 
pp 168-69 provides a much briefer, though 
conceptual, account of the same processes. 
23 Nikolayev's (1975) entire monograph deals 
with this issue. See also, Rosenberg (1991) 
and Sheinin (1978), pp 74-122. 
24 The two branches of dynamics, kinetics and 
kinematics deal, respectively, with the motion 
of rigid bodies abstracted from any external 
force, and with the effects of such forces on 
the motions of the elements of the machine. 
It may be noted that the ways in which the 
elements of the machine are interconnected 
defines its mechanism.The areasofknowledge 
germane to these issues form the basis of 
mechanical engineering. 
25 See the Rosenberg reference in note 23 and, 
in particular, Landau and Rosenberg (1992). 
26 Davies (1980) quoted in Rosenberg (1994), 
p 145, fn 6. 
27 Kolantayev (1981); Bagrit (1966). 
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